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On September 29, 2006, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)' issued
a decision in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.,2 that will affect private employees
across the country. Many of the employees affected by Oakwood will eventu-
ally lose the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) after
years of status as union members. Whether or not public employees will be
affected depends on the public labor law of the individual states.
There are two major concerns regarding the Oakwood decision, as voiced in the
dissenting opinion. The first is that a new class of employees will be created
"who have neither the genuine prerogatives of management, nor the statutory
rights of ordinary employees."' The second is that professionals, who are ex-
pressly provided coverage of the NLRA, may fall into this newly created class.'
Oakwood Healthcare is one of three cases, dubbed the Kentucky River cases, in
which the NLRB reviewed three terms included in section 2(11) of the
NLRA.5 Section 2(11), in conjunction with section 2(3), excludes "supervi-
sors" from the protection of the NLRA and defines them as:
"any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or disci-
pline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."6
The purpose for excluding supervisors from the protections of the NLRA is to
avoid the conflict of interest created by a supervisor's authority to take or cause
action to be taken in an area of employment covered by a collective bargaining
agreement of a fellow bargaining unit employee.7 Where the supervisor is act-
ing within the interest of the employer regarding a fellow employee's terms and
conditions of employment, areas where the interest of the employer and em-
ployee are likely to diverge, such a conflict exists.'
The NLRB's review of the terms 'assign,' 'reasonably to direct,' and 'indepen-
dent judgment' was a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in
Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.' In Kentucky River, the Supreme Court
rejected the NLRB's interpretation of part two of the three-part supervisory
test used by the NLRB. The test, based on § 2(11), excludes employees from
NLRA protection if they are "statutory supervisors," who "(1) [ ] hold the
authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 listed supervisory functions, (2) their
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'exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment,' and (3) their authority is held 'in
the interest of the employer."'o
Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of inde-
pendent judgment, which according to the Court, offered a blanket exclusion
from the test, where the employee's decision had a basis in professional or
technical skill or experience." The Supreme Court rejected this interpreta-
tion, reasoning that it would virtually eliminate 'supervisors' from the Act's
express exclusion.' 2 In response, the NLRB asserted that this application of
the test would be limited to the 'reasonably to direct' function.' 3 The Su-
preme Court rejected this argument as an unjustifiable distinction, contrary to
the text of the statute, and because the other eleven functions may also require
the same basis, professional or technical expertise, for judgment." The Court
reaffirmed prior direction to the NLRB that the supervisory exclusion applies
to any individual, not just non-professionals." The private sector had been
awaiting the NLRB's interpretation of independent judgment since.
The labor sector has been vocal in its opposition to the NLRB taking a posi-
tion that labor considers pro-employer. Prior to the NLRB's September 29,
2006 decision, the Economic Policy Institute estimated that nearly 8 million
workers nationwide could be affected by the NLRB's decision.' One major
public employees' union expressed concern about the Oakwood decision's ef-
fects on the nursing sector in particular: "The ruling created a new definition
of supervisor allowing workers who serve as charge nurses to be classified as
supervisors despite the fact that they do not have any genuine managerial or
supervisory authority. In this women-dominated industry, the new ruling put
many women in a new class of worker - and without a union.""
The impact of the NLRB's September 29, 2006 rulings in Oakwood, Golden
Crest,'" and Croft Metals'9 are not limited to the nursing sector. Nine cases
remanded by the NLRB on September 30, 2006 in light of Oakwood et. al.,
include nurses,2 0 service and maintenance workers, 2 ' a working foreman, 2 2 en-
23 24
gineers,23 and electricians. At current count, the NLRB remanded 46 repre-
sentation cases after the Oakwood decision.25
Certain NLRB members indicated that they do not think that the impact of
Oakwood will be so devastating.26 In an interview earlier this year, "Chairman
Battista emphasized that only 12 of the 236 employees challenged as putative
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supervisors in Oakwood and its companion caseS27 were excluded as supervi-
sors". 28 Member Liebman added, regarding impact, that much will depend on
how the Board actually applies Oakwood going forward.2 9 Speaking directly to
the Economic Policy Institute's 8 million worker impact claim, Member Kirsa-
now stated that he doubts that that many workers will be impacted.30 Chair-
man Battista criticized the same estimate on the basis that it was made before
the NLRB's decision was published.3 ' Furthermore, some health care provid-
ers have assured unions that they will not exclude current bargaining unit
members who are now considered supervisors.32
These effects, or lack thereof, only take private industry and services into con-
sideration. The question yet to be asked is whether the NLRB's interpretation
of independent judgment will be adopted by public labor relations boards.
ILLINOIS PUBLIC LABOR RELATIONS ACT
State labor relations acts extend the protections of the NLRA to public em-
ployees, and in many respects mirror the language and intent of the NLRA.
For example, § 3(n) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, like the NLRA,
excludes supervisors from the protections of the IPLRA. 3 Section 3(r) of the
IPLRA defines a supervisor as:
". . an employee whose principal work is substantially different from that of
his or her subordinates and who has authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct,
reward, or discipline employees, to adjust their grievances, or to effectively
recommend any of those actions, if the exercise of that authority is not of a
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the consistent use of indepen-
dent judgment."34
One key difference between § 3(r) of the IPLRA and § 2(11) of the NLRA lies
in the opening sentence of the IPLRA's definition of a supervisor. The ILPRA
requires that for a public employee to be deemed a supervisor, the employee's
principal work must be either visibly or by its nature substantially different
from that of his or her subordinates.3 ' This requirement alone speaks to the
NLRB's concern about catching the "lead lineman" in the supervisory net.36
The IPLRA not only requires that the majority of a supervisor's work be differ-
ent, but the IPLRA adds an element to the NLRB test that requires an em-
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ployee spend a preponderance of his or her time engaging in supervisory
duties." The IPLRA test for exclusion as a supervisor requires that the em-
ployee "(1) has principal work substantially different from that of his subordi-
nates; (2) has authority to perform one or more of the 11 enumerated
supervisory functions, or to effectively recommend such performance; (3) con-
sistently exercises independent judgment in the interest of the employer in
connection with his or her supervisory activity; and (4) spends a preponder-
ance of his or her employment time engaged in supervisory activities." 3 8
Another difference between the two acts is that the NLRA includes 'assign'
within its twelve supervisory functions, whereas the Illinois Act does not.3 '
Also, the NLRA language includes 'reasonably to direct' as opposed to the
IPLRA's 'direct.' 40 But how substantial are these differences where the
NLRB's latest interpretation of 'independent judgment' is concerned?
The term 'independent judgment,' as interpreted in Oakwooa', applies to all
twelve supervisory indicia, without regard to whether the judgment is exercised
using professional or technical experience." To be 'independent,' the judg-
ment exercised must not be effectively controlled by detailed instructions,
whether included in company rules or policies, verbal instructions from a supe-
rior, or requirements of a collective bargaining agreement.42 However, the trap
door opens if the source of authority allows for discretionary choices.4 3  The
degree of discretion recognized must rise above the 'routine or clerical' to con-
stitute independent judgment.4 4
The independent judgment definition as construed under the IPLRA is as fol-
lows: An employee exercises independent judgment whenever he or she must
choose between two alternatives and the choices are not routine or clerical in
nature or made on the basis of the alleged supervisor's skill, experience, techni-
cal expertise or knowledge. 5 Ministerial-type functions, also referred to as
'routine and clerical,' generally do not require the use of independent judg-
ment.4 ' Even though performing such functions may occasionally entail the
use of discretion or independent judgment, it is not sufficient to satisfy the
independent judgment prong of the supervisory definition under the IPLRA.4
Although both Acts seek the same goals, the way they go about it is not always
the same. The Illinois Labor Relations Board frequently borrows from seminal
U.S. Supreme Court and NLRB cases interpreting the NLRA." However, the
supervisory exclusion is an area where the Illinois Board and the Illinois Courts
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have made little to no mention of NLRA-related cases.4 9 One reason for not
looking to NLRA cases is that the IPLRA's definition of supervisor is narrower
than the NLRA's.5 o In fact, the Illinois Board and courts have consistently
relied upon City ofFreeport as a seminal Illinois case.5 1 Freeport recognizes that
NLRB precedent is useful in determining whether an individual performs any
of the enumerated supervisory functions with independent judgment.5 2 How-
ever, the Illinois preponderance hurdle requires a much greater showing of
time spent exercising independent judgment than does the NLRA.5 ' Note
that the IPLRA's purpose for excluding supervisors from the protections of the
IPLRA is the same as that of the NLRA."
It would seem that the 'skill, experience and knowledge' referred to by the
ILRB is that which is typically thought of as the exercise of 'professional judg-
ment,' and sounds like what the NLRB urged the U.S. Supreme Court to use
as a preclusion to supervisory status in Kentucky River. Like the NLRA, the
IPLRA includes 'professionals' as employees within the protection of the Act.5 5
The question becomes, will public employers in Illinois eventually urge the
Illinois Board to apply the NLRB's latest holding, that decisions based on
professional judgment do not preclude a finding that an employee is a supervi-
sor, and if so, is the NLRB's concern relevant considering the preponderance
requirement under the IPLRA?
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